Charlie Rose

ShalomFreedman  02/17/2009 01:24 PM Report

The most interesting information emerging from this discussion is the contradiction between the Obama pullout plan, and the recommended course of action by Ricks. He believes the U.S. has a long way to go in Iraq. He suggests the distinction between combat and non- combat troops, largely meaningless. He too indicates that despite the success of the 'Surge' it does not mean all is quiet in Iraq. The 'Surge' bought time, but according to Ricks all the conflicts and difficulties remain.

REMant  02/17/2009 12:25 AM Report

I suspect tho that while Iraq was a mostly civil war we brought on by our ridiculous optimism about democracy and neglect of the balance of power there, Afghanistan and Pakistan involve defeating real radicalism, not unlike the VietCong, tho I am not sure that Iraq may not slide into that at some point after we leave, or economic conditions deteriorate further, depending on what Iran thinks about it all. In Vietnam, to oversimplify, we had two different approaches: one, which I'll call the Special Forces approach, was similar to the Petreaus-Odierno approach in Iraq; and, second, the regular army approach, which is what was followed there, because the other really could not work, both because of the NVA, and because the VietCong were not so easy to corral, much less bribe. As a result of that, I suppose, along with the fact that we assumed we would never fight another such war, Special Forces tactics seem to have been forgotten. It wasn't the first time. After WWII amphibious doctrine was similarly lost, and MacArthur was plain lucky at Inchon.

Nica_in_California  02/16/2009 09:02 PM Report

Thomas E. Ricks hagiography of General Raymund Odierno and his version of the W/Keane/Petraeus end run is ludicrous. The version of events Bob Woodward related to Charlie in the interviews following the publication of the War Within and the summary published in Ricks’ paper—The Washington Post—tells us that it was the White House making use of retired general Keane and not the other way around.

The “surge” was W’s tactical device to contain the disaster in Iraq and keep it going until the end of his second term no matter what the cost. It preceded Odierno’s return to Iraq in December 2006 by more than a year.

On October 19, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice informed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the strategy of the Bush Administration in conducting the Iraq war was “…to clear, hold, and build: clear areas from insurgent control, hold them securely, and build durable, national Iraqi institutions.” That a Congress controlled by the Republican Party would take testimony on military strategy changes from the Secretary of State and not from the Secretary of Defense is understandable; that the loyal opposition did not raise a stink is deplorable; and that a pliant mainstream press would not question or investigate it is odious.

Be that as it may, the “surge” strategy was complemented by Petraeus decision to pay tribute to the insurgents to the tune of $300/month per combatant—in the same manner the barbarian hordes were persuaded to abstain from attacking the outposts of the Roman Empire. The objective of this cynical strategy was to leave the new administration with the explosive keg made up of all the unresolved issues in Iraq: the matter of oil revenue sharing, Sunni/Shia ancient hatreds, and the aspirations of the Kurdish to have a country of their own.

According to Woodward, Rice’s testimony took General Cassey and General Abizaid by surprise. Both had taken W at his word—that as the Iraqis stood up to maintain their security themselves the American military would stand down—and were preparing to draw down US forces and speed up the transfer of responsibility to the Iraqis. Rice’s excuse to General Cassey was that she had communicated the strategy change to General Odierno, who was the Assistant to the Chairman of the JCS. That the chain of command had not been followed justified General Cassey calling this end run a “foul.” Thus, the W-Keane-Petraeus/Odierno end run dated back at least to fall 2005, and may explain the reassignment of Odierno to Fort Hood in May 2006, a few days after the Rice/Cassey meeting in Iraq.

Ricks failed to mention in his visit with Charlie, and his recent Washington Post article on the same subject, the Keane/Kagan document, which provided W cover for his decision to ignore the Iraq Study Group document commissioned by Congress. The Keane/Kagan report was prepared and released in draft form on December 16, 2006.

Will President Obama take a page from the W playbook and ensure that generals who disagree with the policy of the Commander-in-Chief are replaced and ultimately retired from active service? If he does, I hope that he has the courage to tell the American people the reasons and not hide his unpopular Iraq policy behind the generals as he predecessor did when he cynically told us that he would follow whatever the generals on the ground recommended.

A plausible explanation as to why Ricks is disseminating half-truths to build up the image of Odierno is that he is part and parcel of a media effort to undermine the commander-in-chief, as he will have no choice but to replace Petraeus or Odierno or both.