Charlie Rose

robdverity  11/04/2009 02:03 AM Report

Normi Prins, "It Takes a Pillage: Behind the Bailouts, Bonuses, and Backroom Deals from Washington to Wallstreet"

"The Ascent of Money," by Niall Ferguson

robdverity  10/31/2009 11:13 PM Report

A former Marine captain who became the first foreign service official to publicly resign in protest over the war in Afghanistan says staying in the country is not in America's interest.

"The losses of our soldiers do not merit anything that comes in line with our strategic interests or values," Matthew Hoh, who signed on as a foreign service official in Afghanistan after fighting in Iraq, tells NPR's Melissa Block.

Hoh resigned last month after spending five working months in Afghanistan. In his resignation letter, he said he had "lost understanding of and confidence in the strategic purpose of the United States' presence in Afghanistan."

Hoh says he is more concerned about why the U.S. is in Afghanistan than debating Gen. Stanley McChrystal's views or those of others in Washington. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, has asked for an additional 40,000 troops, a request President Obama is considering.

"I prefer to keep talking about: Is it worth winning?" Hoh says. "Is it worth losing more lives? And is it worth spending billions of dollars that, frankly, this country does not have?"

Hoh began his public service in the Marine Corps. Then, as a civilian Defense Department employee, he led reconstruction efforts in former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit. Later, as a captain in the Marines, he fought in Iraq's Anbar province, where he was cited for "uncommon bravery." After his stints in Iraq, Hoh signed on as a foreign service official in Afghanistan, working on development efforts in Zabul province, a Taliban hotbed.

In his long resignation letter to the State Department, Hoh says the U.S. has not understood the true nature of the Afghan insurgency, and he uses the word "valleyism" to describe much of the insurgency there.

"In Afghanistan, everything is much more localized," Hoh tells NPR. "Allegiance is to your family, and then to your village or your valley, and that's what they fight for.

"There has not been a traditional central government there and I don't believe a central government is wanted, and actually, I believe, they fight the central government just as much as they fight the foreign occupiers," he adds.

Courtesy of Matthew HohMatthew Hoh speaks with soldiers and airmen from Bravo Co. 1-4 Infantry and the Zabul Provincial Reconstruction Team in the summer of 2009 in Zabul, Afghanistan.

Courtesy of Matthew HohMatthew Hoh speaks with soldiers and airmen from Bravo Co. 1-4 Infantry and the Zabul Provincial Reconstruction Team in the summer of 2009 in Zabul, Afghanistan.

Hoh says the five months he spent in Afghanistan, during which time he worked in two different parts of the country, put him in daily contact with Afghans. He says it was in conversations with them that his thinking on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan evolved.

"They are the ones that really codified my thoughts on this," he says. "And you realize that what they want is to be left alone."

In his letter, Hoh says families must be reassured their dead have sacrificed for a "purpose worthy of futures lost, love vanished, and promised dreams unkept. I have lost confidence such assurances can anymore be made." He says it was difficult for him to write that.

"But I don't believe we should continue losing and sacrificing our young men and women for goals that meet no strategic purpose to the United States," he tells NPR. "And the idea that we should continue fighting there just because we have been fighting there for the last eight years I think is completely irrational."

Hoh dismisses concerns, raised by others such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, that a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan will prompt a Taliban comeback and, consequently, a return of al-Qaida. He says after al-Qaida lost its Afghan safe haven following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the group evolved its strategy, looking beyond a political or geographical boundary.

"They are not looking for a safe haven in Afghanistan. They don't need that," he says. "They've already got safe havens in half a dozen other countries — Somalia, Sudan, Yemen."

More to the point, he says, the vast majority of attackers in al-Qaida's successful operations, including Sept. 11, are not from the ethnic Pashto belt of Afghanistan or Pakistan. They are, in fact, from the West and the Persian Gulf states. The continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan only reinforces al-Qaida's message, and causes people to want to fight the West and to join its ranks, he says.

"We have an approach where we haven't evolved ourselves. We're still set up to do our foreign policy and our defense operations like we were in 1991, and we need to change," Hoh says. "Al-Qaida changed, they evolved. They got smart about how they're going to do their operations. We need to do the same."

robdverity  10/13/2009 08:13 PM Report

Richard Engel NBC 10/7/09

Due to delayed ‘activation’ of pertinent sites, taking second choice of several irrelevant choice(s).

Brian Glyn Williams and David Kilcullen, both orthodoxy spewing foils for the MI oligarches, were disingenuous to a fault. Especially Williams. To full of certitudes - an ipso facto disqualifier. Anathema! Richard Engel, two nights earlier, was much more credible.

Richard Engel, NBC (Charlie Rose 10/07/09), gave (at last) an honest assessment of Af-Pak. But, alas, with a paradoxical conclusion, i.e., not to leave posthaste, despite a realistically hopeless outlook. Engle lamented leaving the Pakistani’s after exhorting them to take up the battle against the Taliban. ???? I don’t get it. It’s their problem to resolve (or not) in any level of efficiency (or not) they chose. The Pashtun (Source of Taliban) are 15 per cent of Pakistan. In other words doable if they have the will.

Engle could discern no distinction between Taliban and al Qaeda, and the Taliban were Pashtun (but all Pashtun are not Taliban). He further asserted that drone missiles were not the answer because of civilian casualties and lack of target definition.

As an aside, for those who like to keep score against the 3,000+ World Trade Center 9/11/2001 deaths, the raw score in body count is more than settled with Afghan troops killed at 11,522; Afghan civilians killed at 7,589; [1,371 coalition troops, contractors and six journalists]. So the eye-for-an-eye, and a tooth-for-a-tooth (until we’re all blind and toothless crowd) should be satiated.

Given that and the fact that Osama bin Laden has apparently safely ensconced himself out of reach, what is our objective? The elusive end-game? How about an Hippocratic Oath takeoff, of “Second, Do no (more) harm!” The hardliners are shuddering, but remember tough guys we’re already more than even based on body count - what other metric is there as far as vengeance?

Formulations to consider, where: O = Outcome, T=US Troops, E = Enemies, C = Created, V = Vanquished (killed), I = Indifferent.

Scenarios: 1- Add 40,000 to 68,000 troops and 75,000 contractors already there. 2-Add 20,000 troops. 3-Add none. 4-Add none and remove all troops and contractors.

Assumptions: 1- For each Enemy (Pashtun) killed a MINIMUM of three other Pashtuns will grieve and harbor resentment, 2- The current rate of say (11522+7589)/68000x8 = 35 Pashtuns/US troop/yr vanquished (euphemism for killed) per 1,000 troops will continue.

Therefore, the outcomes O for for the four scenarios are shown below:

Where: Outcome O = T in thousands x Vanquished per year per thousand = Annual Pashtun Kill.

Scenario 1: O = (68k + 40k) x 35 = 3780 / yr

Scenario 2: O = (68k + 20k) x 35 = 3080 / yr

Scenario 3: O = (68k + 0 k) x 35 = 2380 / yr

Scenario 4: O = (68k - 68k) x 35 = 0 / yr

These hypotheticals could be reduced by strategical policies and actions. But at whatever level, they have consequences. If it can be safely assumed that at least three generations carry emotional trauma for at least three survivors of the ‘vanquished’ 150 enemy-years (E-yrs) will be created for each Pashtun killed. Therefore, for the four scenarios the following potential E-yrs of terrorists will be created ©.

Scenario 1: C = 150 E-yrs x 3780 = 567,000 Enemy-years

Scenario 2: C = 150 E-yrs x 3080 = 462,000 Enemy-years

Scenario 3: C = 150 E-yrs x 2380 = 357,000 Enemy-years

Scenario 4: C = 150 E-yrs x 0 = 0 Enemy-years

Reminder, these figures are for one year. Another eight years increases Scenario 1 to 4,536,000 Enemy-years for example.

Simplistic example: they experience casualties when they go out on patrols in the remote outposts. When they don’t, they don’t. DUH!

Iraq will never REALLY resolve their Sunni - Shia problem until we leave and they are forced to reach an accommodation one way or another, equitable or not. Repressive a la Sadam or not, they’ll own it.

Af-Pak as well will never REALLY resolve their Pashtun (aka Taliban, al Qaeda) problem until we leave and they are forced to reach an accommodation one way or another, equitable or not.

WE NEED TO CUT OUR LOSSES, PULL OUT AND COME HOME - NOW!!

So, there you go Mr. President, for every 1,000 troops sent to Af-Pak, the potential for diminishing the NY sky-line is increased by 5,250 Enemy-years, for each year they are deployed. Such scientifically, mathematically derived S.W.A.G. precision is undeniable. Ignore at your own peril and demeaning of your newly acquired Nobel peace prize. Prove it and bring em home!

With all these potential enemies (below), we can’t waste resources on a select few. And we can’t conquer the world - even though the list is long enough to warrant paranoia - we have to ramp up our intelligence, ramp down our arrogance, and pressure ME peace settlements.

Yemen and Somalia are probably more real threats anyway. Terrorism is not geography, it’s an idea. Like Engle said, when someone says he’s al Qaeda, he pretty much is (regardless of race, creed or location on the planet) We had to work at this world-wide disenchantment..Note the innumerable number of countries represented.

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Al-Shabaab, Ansar al-Sunnah, Armed Islamic Group, Asbat al-Ansar, Aum Shinrikyo, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA), Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG), HAMAS , Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islam/Bangladesh (HUJI-B), Harakat ul-Mujahadin (HUM), Hizballah, Islamic Jihad Union, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan , Jaish-e-Mohammed , Jemaah Islamiya Organization , Al-Jihad , Kahane Chai (Kach) , Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT) , Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) , Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) , Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Mujahadin-e Khalq Organization, National Liberation Army (ELN), Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction, Palestinian Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command, Al-Qa’ida, Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn), Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Real IRA, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Revolutionary Nuclei, Revolutionary Organization 17 November, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front, Shining Path, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.