Comment by Neme on Friday, Jul 11 at 02:07 AM

It has always been my opinion that Republicans have always been much more sensitive when it comes to the 2000 elections. Because nobody likes to be told ''I told you so''. And their guy screwed up big time. What can I say, It's called Hubris(Look it up). And by the way it's not whining, their just here to promote a movie that is about something that is an important part of our history and a compelling story. So please don't make me dislike you any more than I already do. So good day.

Comment by recount on Friday, Jun 6 at 03:39 PM

The yappers will spend the next 4 years doing another recount or making a movie called Recount 2. LOL.

Comment by Phooey on Thursday, Jun 5 at 06:37 PM

George Will is a tired sunburned crank. Phooey CU.

Comment by Sam on Thursday, Jun 5 at 11:22 AM

Terminator: Your conclusions are totally correct. It has all been gibberish. You needed to add one very important matter. The Supreme Court ruling you mentioned had a vote of 7-2. The "myth" that all of this was all a 5-4 votes is a myth made by the media and now it is a myth made by movies. The media has been blatantly dishonest in the presentation of the 2000 election matter for all of these year, and therby misleading many. Thanks for your "summary conclusion."

Comment by Terminator on Wednesday, Jun 4 at 11:39 PM

Carol and all her blind followers PLEASE... how long is this jibberish going to drag on? People, may I suggest that you simply go to the actual and official opinion drafted by the Supreme Court rather than rewriting history on this forum inside out, up side down and backwards until H freezes over. The opinion is well written, in plain English and does not require a degree in rocket science to read and understand. The Supreme Court did in fact rule correctly. The Florida Supreme Court did not privide a METHOD for recounting EVERY vote that would be fool proof and that could be applied EQUALLY to each and every vote that would have to be recounted. It is not enough to say recount all the votes. You must also provide a way to recount them by the dead line outlined in Florida law and in a manner that would provide EQUAL and FAIR treatment for each and every vote cast by each and every voter in order for the recount to be a FAIR recount. That is the missing link and will always be the missing link. Machines are equal and fair. They don't care one way or the other when they count votes. That is why machines are often used to count votes. And machines are also fair in the way they reject votes or skip votes too. But, if you want people to do the counting then you better be able to provide them with guidelines that can be used for the entire state and that will establish both equal and fair precesses during that recount. Otherwise, you will never get a fair recount. If you want the facts of the case go here and read them. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CASE&court=US&vol=531&page=98 The opinion(s) is no more wordy than those Carol has crafted and they are just as, if not more, logical as well. If you can't be bothered to read the actual opinion(s) then here is a pretty good summary of the heart of the issue and why the judges on the Supreme Court ruled the way they did. (quote)...we are presented with a situation where a state court with the power to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards. When a court orders a statewide remedy, there must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied. Given the Court's assessment that the recount process underway was probably being conducted in an unconstitutional manner, the Court stayed the order directing the recount so IT COULD HEAR THIS CASE and render an expedited decision. The contest provision, as it was mandated by the State Supreme Court, is not well calculated to sustain the CONFIDENCE that ALL citizens MUST HAVE in the outcome of elections. The State has not shown that its procedures include the necessary safeguards. The problem, for instance, of the estimated 110,000 overvotes has NOT been addressed, although Chief Justice Wells called attention to the concern in his dissenting opinion.(end quote) GIVE IT A REST. Terminated.

Comment by Carol on Tuesday, Jun 3 at 08:20 PM

FINALLY, Sam, you need to read, thoroughly, the dissenting opinion of the FOUR justices who disagreed with the "felonius five". It was written by Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join except as to Part Iâ??Aâ??1, and with whom Justice Souter joins as to Part I, dissenting. AND IT READS: The Court was wrong to take this case. It was wrong to grant a stay. It should now vacate that stay and permit the Florida Supreme Court to decide whether the recount should resume. I. The political implications of this case for the country are momentous. But the federal legal questions presented, with one exception, are insubstantial. A.1. The majority raises three Equal Protection problems with the Florida Supreme Courtâ??s recount order: first, the failure to include overvotes in the manual recount; second, the fact that all ballots, rather than simply the undervotes, were recounted in some, but not all, counties; and third, the absence of a uniform, specific standard to guide the recounts. As far as the first issue is concerned, petitioners presented no evidence, to this Court or to any Florida court, that a manual recount of overvotes would identify additional legal votes. The same is true of the second, and, in addition, the majorityâ??s reasoning would seem to invalidate any state provision for a manual recount of individual counties in a statewide election. The majorityâ??s third concern does implicate principles of fundamental fairness. The majority concludes that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a manual recount be governed not only by the uniform general standard of the â??clear intent of the voter,â?? but also by uniform subsidiary standards (for example, a uniform determination whether indented, but not perforated, â??undervotesâ?? should count). The opinion points out that the Florida Supreme Court ordered the inclusion of Broward Countyâ??s undercounted â??legal votesâ?? even though those votes included ballots that were not perforated but simply â??dimpled,â?? while newly recounted ballots from other counties will likely include only votes determined to be â??legalâ?? on the basis of a stricter standard. In light of our previous remand, the Florida Supreme Court may have been reluctant to adopt a more specific standard than that provided for by the legislature for fear of exceeding its authority under Article II. However, since the use of different standards could favor one or the other of the candidates, since time was, and is, too short to permit the lower courts to iron out significant differences through ordinary judicial review, and since the relevant distinction was embodied in the order of the Stateâ??s highest court, I agree that, in these very special circumstances, basic principles of fairness may well have counseled the adoption of a uniform standard to address the problem. In light of the majorityâ??s disposition, I need not decide whether, or the extent to which, as a remedial matter, the Constitution would place limits upon the content of the uniform standard. 2. Nonetheless, there is no justification for the majorityâ??s remedy, which is simply to reverse the lower court and halt the recount entirely. An appropriate remedy would be, instead, to remand this case with instructions that, even at this late date, would permit the Florida Supreme Court to require recounting all undercounted votes in Florida, including those from Broward, Volusia, Palm Beach, and Miami-Dade Counties, whether or not previously recounted prior to the end of the protest period, and to do so in accordance with a single-uniform substandard. The majority justifies stopping the recount entirely on the ground that there is no more time. In particular, the majority relies on the lack of time for the Secretary to review and approve equipment needed to separate undervotes. But the majority reaches this conclusion in the absence of any record evidence that the recount could not have been completed in the time allowed by the Florida Supreme Court. The majority finds facts outside of the record on matters that state courts are in a far better position to address. Of course, it is too late for any such recount to take place by December 12, the date by which election disputes must be decided if a State is to take advantage of the safe harbor provisions of 3 U.S.C. § 5. Whether there is time to conduct a recount prior to December 18, when the electors are scheduled to meet, is a matter for the state courts to determine. And whether, under Florida law, Florida could or could not take further action is obviously a matter for Florida courts, not this Court, to decide. See ante, at 13 (per curiam). By halting the manual recount, and thus ensuring that the uncounted legal votes will not be counted under any standard, this Court crafts a remedy out of proportion to the asserted harm. And that remedy harms the very fairness interests the Court is attempting to protect. The manual recount would itself redress a problem of unequal treatment of ballots. As Justice Stevens points out, see ante, at 4 and n. 4 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion), the ballots of voters in counties that use punch-card systems are more likely to be disqualified than those in counties using optical-scanning systems. According to recent news reports, variations in the undervote rate are even more pronounced. See Fessenden, No-Vote Rates Higher in Punch Card Count, N. Y. Times, Dec. 1, 2000, p. A29 (reporting that 0.3% of ballots cast in 30 Florida counties using optical-scanning systems registered no Presidential vote, in comparison to 1.53% in the 15 counties using Votomatic punch card ballots). Thus, in a system that allows counties to use different types of voting systems, voters already arrive at the polls with an unequal chance that their votes will be counted. I do not see how the fact that this results from countiesâ?? selection of different voting machines rather than a court order makes the outcome any more fair. Nor do I understand why the Florida Supreme Courtâ??s recount order, which helps to redress this inequity, must be entirely prohibited based on a deficiency that could easily be remedied. B. The remainder of petitionersâ?? claims, which are the focus of the Chief Justiceâ??s concurrence, raise no significant federal questions. I cannot agree that the Chief Justiceâ??s unusual review of state law in this case, see ante, at 5â??8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting opinion), is justified by reference either to Art. II, §1, or to 3 U.S.C. § 5. Moreover, even were such review proper, the conclusion that the Florida Supreme Courtâ??s decision contravenes federal law is untenable. While conceding that, in most cases, â??comity and respect for federalism compel us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law,â?? the concurrence relies on some combination of Art. II, §1, and 3 U.S.C. § 5 to justify the majorityâ??s conclusion that this case is one of the few in which we may lay that fundamental principle aside. Ante, at 2 (Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. The concurrenceâ??s primary foundation for this conclusion rests on an appeal to plain text: Art. II, §1â??s grant of the power to appoint Presidential electors to the State â??Legislature.â?? Ibid. But neither the text of Article II itself nor the only case the concurrence cites that interprets Article II, McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), leads to the conclusion that Article II grants unlimited power to the legislature, devoid of any state constitutional limitations, to select the manner of appointing electors. See id., at 41 (specifically referring to state constitutional provision in upholding state law regarding selection of electors). Nor, as Justice Stevens points out, have we interpreted the Federal constitutional provision most analogous to Art. II, §1â??Art. I, §4â??in the strained manner put forth in the concurrence. Ante, at 1â??2 and n. 1 (dissenting opinion). The concurrenceâ??s treatment of §5 as â??inform[ing\â?? its interpretation of Article II, §1, cl. 2, ante, at 3 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring), is no more convincing. The Chief Justice contends that our opinion in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., ante, p. ____, (per curiam) (Bush I), in which we stated that â??a legislative wish to take advantage of [§5\ would counsel againstâ?? a construction of Florida law that Congress might deem to be a change in law, id., (slip op. at 6), now means that this Court â??must ensure that post-election state court actions do not frustrate the legislative desire to attain the â??safe harborâ?? provided by §5.â?? Ante, at 3. However, §5 is part of the rules that govern Congressâ?? recognition of slates of electors. Nowhere in Bush I did we establish that this Court had the authority to enforce §5. Nor did we suggest that the permissive â??counsel againstâ?? could be transformed into the mandatory â??must ensure.â?? And nowhere did we intimate, as the concurrence does here, that a state court decision that threatens the safe harbor provision of §5 does so in violation of Article II. The concurrenceâ??s logic turns the presumption that legislatures would wish to take advantage of § 5â??s â??safe harborâ?? provision into a mandate that trumps other statutory provisions and overrides the intent that the legislature did express. But, in any event, the concurrence, having conducted its review, now reaches the wrong conclusion. It says that â??the Florida Supreme Courtâ??s interpretation of the Florida election laws impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair reading required, in violation of Article II.â?? Ante, at 4â??5 (Rehnquist, C. J, concurring). But what precisely is the distortion? Apparently, it has three elements. First, the Florida court, in its earlier opinion, changed the election certification date from November 14 to November 26. Second, the Florida court ordered a manual recount of â??undercountedâ?? ballots that could not have been fully completed by the December 12 â??safe harborâ?? deadline. Third, the Florida court, in the opinion now under review, failed to give adequate deference to the determinations of canvassing boards and the Secretary. To characterize the first element as a â??distortion,â?? however, requires the concurrence to second-guess the way in which the state court resolved a plain conflict in the language of different statutes. Compare Fla. Stat. §102.166 (2001) (foreseeing manual recounts during the protest period) with §102.111 (setting what is arguably too short a deadline for manual recounts to be conducted); compare §102.112(1) (stating that the Secretary â??mayâ?? ignore late returns) with §102.111(1) (stating that the Secretary â??shallâ?? ignore late returns). In any event, that issue no longer has any practical importance and cannot justify the reversal of the different Florida court decision before us now. To characterize the second element as a â??distortionâ?? requires the concurrence to overlook the fact that the inability of the Florida courts to conduct the recount on time is, in significant part, a problem of the Courtâ??s own making. The Florida Supreme Court thought that the recount could be completed on time, and, within hours, the Florida Circuit Court was moving in an orderly fashion to meet the deadline. This Court improvidently entered a stay. As a result, we will never know whether the recount could have been completed. Nor can one characterize the third element as â??impermissibl[e\ distort[ing\â?? once one understands that there are two sides to the opinionâ??s argument that the Florida Supreme Court â??virtually eliminated the Secretaryâ??s discretion.â?? Ante, at 9 (Rehnquist, C. J, concurring). The Florida statute in question was amended in 1999 to provide that the â??grounds for contesting an electionâ?? include the â??rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to â?¦ place in doubt the result of the election.â?? Fla. Stat. §§102.168(3), (3)(c) (2000). And the parties have argued about the proper meaning of the statuteâ??s term â??legal vote.â?? The Secretary has claimed that a â??legal voteâ?? is a vote â??properly executed in accordance with the instructions provided to all registered voters.â?? Brief for Respondent Harris et al. 10. On that interpretation, punchcard ballots for which the machines cannot register a vote are not â??legalâ?? votes. Id., at 14. The Florida Supreme Court did not accept her definition. But it had a reason. Its reason was that a different provision of Florida election laws (a provision that addresses damaged or defective ballots) says that no vote shall be disregarded â??if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined by the canvassing boardâ?? (adding that ballots should not be counted â??if it is impossible to determine the electorâ??s choiceâ??). Fla. Stat. §101.5614(5) (2000). Given this statutory language, certain roughly analogous judicial precedent, e.g., Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough, 75 So. 411 (Fla. 1917) (per curiam), and somewhat similar determinations by courts throughout the Nation, see cases cited infra, at 9, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the term â??legal voteâ?? means a vote recorded on a ballot that clearly reflects what the voter intended. Gore v. Harris, ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (2000) (slip op., at 19). That conclusion differs from the conclusion of the Secretary. But nothing in Florida law requires the Florida Supreme Court to accept as determinative the Secretaryâ??s view on such a matter. Nor can one say that the Courtâ??s ultimate determination is so unreasonable as to amount to a constitutionally â??impermissible distort[ion\â?? of Florida law. The Florida Supreme Court, applying this definition, decided, on the basis of the record, that respondents had shown that the ballots undercounted by the voting machines contained enough â??legal votesâ?? to place â??the resultsâ?? of the election â??in doubt.â?? Since only a few hundred votes separated the candidates, and since the â??undercountedâ?? ballots numbered tens of thousands, it is difficult to see how anyone could find this conclusion unreasonable-however strict the standard used to measure the voterâ??s â??clear intent.â?? Nor did this conclusion â??stripâ?? canvassing boards of their discretion. The boards retain their traditional discretionary authority during the protest period. And during the contest period, as the court stated, â??the Canvassing Boardâ??s actions [during the protest period\ may constitute evidence that a ballot does or does not qualify as a legal vote.â?? Id., at *13. Whether a local county canvassing boardâ??s discretionary judgment during the protest period not to conduct a manual recount will be set aside during a contest period depends upon whether a candidate provides additional evidence that the rejected votes contain enough â??legal votesâ?? to place the outcome of the race in doubt. To limit the local canvassing boardâ??s discretion in this way is not to eliminate that discretion. At the least, one could reasonably so believe. The statute goes on to provide the Florida circuit judge with authority to â??fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation . . . is investigated, examined, or checked, . . . and to provide any relief appropriate.â?? Fla. Stat. §102.168(8) (2000) (emphasis added). The Florida Supreme Court did just that. One might reasonably disagree with the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of these, or other, words in the statute. But I do not see how one could call its plain language interpretation of a 1999 statutory change so misguided as no longer to qualify as judicial interpretation or as a usurpation of the authority of the State legislature. Indeed, other state courts have interpreted roughly similar state statutes in similar ways. See, e.g., In re Election of U.S. Representative for Second Congressional Dist., 231 Conn. 602, 621, 653 A. 2d 79, 90â??91 (1994) (â??Whatever the process used to vote and to count votes, differences in technology should not furnish a basis for disregarding the bedrock principle that the purpose of the voting process is to ascertain the intent of the votersâ??); Brown v. Carr, 130 W. Va. 401, 460, 43 S. E.2d 401, 404â??405 (1947) (â??[W\hether a ballot shall be counted . . . depends on the intent of the voter . . . . Courts decry any resort to technical rules in reaching a conclusion as to the intent of the voterâ??). I repeat, where is the â??impermissibleâ?? distortion?II. Despite the reminder that this case involves â??an election for the President of the United States,â?? ante, at 1 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring), no preeminent legal concern, or practical concern related to legal questions, required this Court to hear this case, let alone to issue a stay that stopped Floridaâ??s recount process in its tracks. With one exception, petitionersâ?? claims do not ask us to vindicate a constitutional provision designed to protect a basic human right. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Petitioners invoke fundamental fairness, namely, the need for procedural fairness, including finality. But with the one â??equal protectionâ?? exception, they rely upon law that focuses, not upon that basic need, but upon the constitutional allocation of power. Respondents invoke a competing fundamental considerationâ??the need to determine the voterâ??s true intent. But they look to state law, not to federal constitutional law, to protect that interest. Neither side claims electoral fraud, dishonesty, or the like. And the more fundamental equal protection claim might have been left to the state court to resolve if and when it was discovered to have mattered. It could still be resolved through a remand conditioned upon issuance of a uniform standard; it does not require reversing the Florida Supreme Court. Of course, the selection of the President is of fundamental national importance. But that importance is political, not legal. And this Court should resist the temptation unnecessarily to resolve tangential legal disputes, where doing so threatens to determine the outcome of the election. The Constitution and federal statutes themselves make clear that restraint is appropriate. They set forth a road map of how to resolve disputes about electors, even after an election as close as this one. That road map foresees resolution of electoral disputes by state courts. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (providing that, where a â??State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to [election day\, for its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of . . . electors . . . by judicial or other methods,â?? the subsequently chosen electors enter a safe harbor free from congressional challenge). But it nowhere provides for involvement by the United States Supreme Court. To the contrary, the Twelfth Amendment commits to Congress the authority and responsibility to count electoral votes. A federal statute, the Electoral Count Act, enacted after the close 1876 Hayes-Tilden Presidential election, specifies that, after States have tried to resolve disputes (through â??judicialâ?? or other means), Congress is the body primarily authorized to resolve remaining disputes. See Electoral Count Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 373, 3 U.S.C. § 5 6, and 15. The legislative history of the Act makes clear its intent to commit the power to resolve such disputes to Congress, rather than the courts: â??The two Houses are, by the Constitution, authorized to make the count of electoral votes. They can only count legal votes, and in doing so must determine, from the best evidence to be had, what are legal votes .... The power to determine rests with the two Houses, and there is no other constitutional tribunal.â?? H. Rep. No. 1638, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1886) (report submitted by Rep. Caldwell, Select Committee on the Election of President and Vice-President). The Member of Congress who introduced the Act added: â??The power to judge of the legality of the votes is a necessary consequent of the power to count. The existence of this power is of absolute necessity to the preservation of the Government. The interests of all the States in their relations to each other in the Federal Union demand that the ultimate tribunal to decide upon the election of President should be a constituent body, in which the States in their federal relationships and the people in their sovereign capacity should be represented.â?? 18 Cong. Rec. 30 (1886). â??Under the Constitution who else could decide? Who is nearer to the State in determining a question of vital importance to the whole union of States than the constituent body upon whom the Constitution has devolved the duty to count the vote?â?? Id., at 31. The Act goes on to set out rules for the congressional determination of disputes about those votes. If, for example, a state submits a single slate of electors, Congress must count those votes unless both Houses agree that the votes â??have not been . . . regularly given.â?? 3 U.S.C. § 15. If, as occurred in 1876, one or more states submits two sets of electors, then Congress must determine whether a slate has entered the safe harbor of §5, in which case its votes will have â??conclusiveâ?? effect. Ibid. If, as also occurred in 1876, there is controversy about â??which of two or more of such State authorities . . . is the lawful tribunalâ?? authorized to appoint electors, then each House shall determine separately which votes are â??supported by the decision of such State so authorized by its law.â?? Ibid. If the two Houses of Congress agree, the votes they have approved will be counted. If they disagree, then â??the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have been certified by the executive of the State, under the seal thereof, shall be counted.â?? Ibid. Given this detailed, comprehensive scheme for counting electoral votes, there is no reason to believe that federal law either foresees or requires resolution of such a political issue by this Court. Nor, for that matter, is there any reason to that think the Constitutionâ??s Framers would have reached a different conclusion. Madison, at least, believed that allowing the judiciary to choose the presidential electors â??was out of the question.â?? Madison, July 25, 1787 (reprinted in 5 Elliotâ??s Debates on the Federal Constitution 363 (2d ed. 1876)). The decision by both the Constitutionâ??s Framers and the 1886 Congress to minimize this Courtâ??s role in resolving close federal presidential elections is as wise as it is clear. However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to resolve difficult electoral disputes, Congress, being a political body, expresses the peopleâ??s will far more accurately than does an unelected Court. And the peopleâ??s will is what elections are about. Moreover, Congress was fully aware of the danger that would arise should it ask judges, unarmed with appropriate legal standards, to resolve a hotly contested Presidential election contest. Just after the 1876 Presidential election, Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana each sent two slates of electors to Washington. Without these States, Tilden, the Democrat, had 184 electoral votes, one short of the number required to win the Presidency. With those States, Hayes, his Republican opponent, would have had 185. In order to choose between the two slates of electors, Congress decided to appoint an electoral commission composed of five Senators, five Representatives, and five Supreme Court Justices. Initially the Commission was to be evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats, with Justice David Davis, an Independent, to possess the decisive vote. However, when at the last minute the Illinois Legislature elected Justice Davis to the United States Senate, the final position on the Commission was filled by Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley. The Commission divided along partisan lines, and the responsibility to cast the deciding vote fell to Justice Bradley. He decided to accept the votes by the Republican electors, and thereby awarded the Presidency to Hayes. Justice Bradley immediately became the subject of vociferous attacks. Bradley was accused of accepting bribes, of being captured by railroad interests, and of an eleventh-hour change in position after a night in which his house â??was surrounded by the carriagesâ?? of Republican partisans and railroad officials. C. Woodward, Reunion and Reaction 159â??160 (1966). Many years later, Professor Bickel concluded that Bradley was honest and impartial. He thought that â?? â??the great questionâ?? for Bradley was, in fact, whether Congress was entitled to go behind election returns or had to accept them as certified by state authorities,â?? an â??issue of principle.â?? The Least Dangerous Branch 185 (1962). Nonetheless, Bickel points out, the legal question upon which Justice Bradleyâ??s decision turned was not very important in the contemporaneous political context. He says that â??in the circumstances the issue of principle was trivial, it was overwhelmed by all that hung in the balance, and it should not have been decisive.â?? Ibid. For present purposes, the relevance of this history lies in the fact that the participation in the work of the electoral commission by five Justices, including Justice Bradley, did not lend that process legitimacy. Nor did it assure the public that the process had worked fairly, guided by the law. Rather, it simply embroiled Members of the Court in partisan conflict, thereby undermining respect for the judicial process. And the Congress that later enacted the Electoral Count Act knew it. This history may help to explain why I think it not only legally wrong, but also most unfortunate, for the Court simply to have terminated the Florida recount. Those who caution judicial restraint in resolving political disputes have described the quintessential case for that restraint as a case marked, among other things, by the â??strangeness of the issue,â?? its â??intractability to principled resolution,â?? its â??sheer momentousness, . . . which tends to unbalance judicial judgment,â?? and â??the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.â?? Bickel, supra, at 184. Those characteristics mark this case. At the same time, as I have said, the Court is not acting to vindicate a fundamental constitutional principle, such as the need to protect a basic human liberty. No other strong reason to act is present. Congressional statutes tend to obviate the need. And, above all, in this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split decision runs the risk of undermining the publicâ??s confidence in the Court itself. That confidence is a public treasure. It has been built slowly over many years, some of which were marked by a Civil War and the tragedy of segregation. It is a vitally necessary ingredient of any successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself. We run no risk of returning to the days when a President (responding to this Courtâ??s efforts to protect the Cherokee Indians) might have said, â??John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!â?? Loth, Chief Justice John Marshall and The Growth of the American Republic 365 (1948). But we do risk a self-inflicted wound â?? a wound that may harm not just the Court, but the Nation. I fear that in order to bring this agonizingly long election process to a definitive conclusion, we have not adequately attended to that necessary â??check upon our own exercise of power,â?? â??our own sense of self-restraint.â?? United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis once said of the Court, â??The most important thing we do is not doing.â?? Bickel, supra, at 71. What it does today, the Court should have left undone. I would repair the damage done as best we now can, by permitting the Florida recount to continue under uniform standards. I respectfully dissent.

Comment by Sam on Tuesday, Jun 3 at 06:27 PM

Carol, this should be our day of celebration. The primaries are over and "our man" will lead us to victory this autumn and we then can put all of this behind us. I trust that you share with me this opportunity for change. By next year, the lambs will be sleeping with the wolves. Until then, here are some more "very selective" published comments by consortium memebers that did the detailed review of the Florida recount matter. I tried to tell you, it seems like years ago, that it is clear that more people tried to vote for Gore than for Bush, but the rules, the machines and the various countiesâ?? method of counting votes likely gave the election to Bush. And I repeat "gave." It was not the Supreme Court. It was not the Bush people. The 2000 election was lost because many of the Florida voters did not follow the rules and procedures of establishing a valid ballot. That voter errors occurred almost exclusively in Democrat precincts and districts, which were set up, monitored and controlled by Democrats and not Republicans. In conclusion Carol, had Gore won in Tennessee, his home state or Arkansas, Clinton's home state, Florida would not have mattered. If our Democrats in Florida marked their ballots according to the rules set up by our fellow Democratic committee people, Gore would have won. Bush did not win this election. We Democrats lost it for the above mentioned reasons. It has nothing to do with the Supreme Court. The fault is with Democrats. â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦.Here are my "highly selective" comments by consortium partners. This, in my view, gives a good background. It avoids the nonsense of Bugliosi and treason. It avoids the nonsense that the Supreme Court of the United States stole the election for Bush. This debate all started with some Hollywood types out there slanting a movie into something that has zero credibility. This should be our day in the sun. Our Party is on the way to real change. Rejoice. Move on. HERE ARE MY SELECTIVE CLOSES. Chicago Tribune, 11/12/01 â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦ "The most comprehensive study of the troubled presidential election in Florida shows the main culprits were simple and fixable: ballot design, inconsistent election rules and voter error. The yearlong review of the Florida election reveals that even if the U.S. Supreme Court had allowed a recount of ballots, there is no clear indication that Democrat Al Gore would have gained enough votes to triumph over Republican George W. Bush. A close examination of the ballots also suggests that more Floridians attempted to choose Gore over Bush. But more Gore supporters improperly marked their ballots, leaving Bush with more valid votes. The independent study offers an unprecedented look into the haphazard process of the making of a president, highlighting a fragmented system in 67 counties that invalidated thousands of votes and clouded the unprecedented legal odyssey to the White House. A consortium of eight news organizations, including the Tribune Co., commissioned the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago to take the deepest look yet into the Florida ballot box, trying to determine why the stateâ??s voting system broke down. A close examination of the ballots also suggests that more Floridians attempted to choose Gore over Bush. But more Gore supporters improperly marked their ballots, leaving Bush with more valid votes. The independent study offers an unprecedented look into the haphazard process of the making of a president, highlighting a fragmented system in 67 counties that invalidated thousands of votes and clouded the unprecedented legal odyssey to the White House." Associated Press, 11/12/01 â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦ "A vote-by-vote review of untallied ballots in the 2000 Florida presidential election indicates George W. Bush would have narrowly prevailed in the partial recounts sought by Al Gore , but Gore might have reversed the outcome - by the barest of margins - had he pursued and gained a complete statewide recount. Bush eventually won Florida, and thus the White House, by 537 votes out of more than 6 million cast. But questions about the uncounted votes lingered. The new data, compiled by The Associated Press and seven other news organizations, also suggested that Gore followed a legal strategy after Election Day that would have led to defeat even if it had not been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. Gore sought a recount of a relatively small portion of the state's disputed ballots while the review indicates his only chance lay in a course he advocated publicly but did not pursue in court - a full statewide recount of all Florida's untallied votes." Washington Post, 11/12/01 â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦â?¦. "In all likelihood, George W. Bush still would have won Florida and the presidency last year if either of two limited recounts â?? one requested by Al Gore, the other ordered by the Florida Supreme Court â?? had been completed, according to a study commissioned by The Washington Post and other news organizations. But if Gore had found a way to trigger a statewide recount of all disputed ballots, or if the courts had required it, the result likely would have been different. An examination of uncounted ballots throughout Florida found enough where voter intent was clear to give Gore the narrowest of margins".... THE END. ALL THE BEST CAROL.

Comment by Carol on Tuesday, Jun 3 at 04:20 PM

Sam: In the per curiam opinion, by a vote of 7-2, the Court held that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional, and BY A VOTE OF 5-4, the Court held that no alternative scheme could be established within the time limits established by Florida Legislature. The per curiam opinion was argued on the basis of Equal Protection. In other words, they did NOT argue that an alternative scheme was ILLEGAL, merely that because they MADE the December 12 "safe harbor" the binding deadline, that there was no time. This was intellectually dishonest, as the "safe harbor" deadline was not the definitive deadline but merely the deadline whereby the electors could not be challenged by the legislature. The CRITICAL 5-4 portion of the per curiam opinion involved the REMEDY for that Equal Protection violation. Three of the concurring justices also asserted that the Florida Supreme Court had violated Article II, § 1, cl. 2 of the Constitution, by misinterpreting Florida election law that had been enacted by the Florida Legislature. The Court ruled 5-4 that no constitutionally valid recount could be completed by a December 12 "safe harbor" deadline. The Court asserted that "the Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended the State's electors to 'participat[e\ fully in the federal electoral process,' as provided in 3 U. S. C. §5." The Court therefore effectively ended the election, because "the Florida Legislature intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U. S. C. §5." FOUR justices dissented â?? two appointed by Democrats and two by Republicans â?? as to stopping the recount. The four dissenters invoked the principle of fairness. The actual counting had ended with the December 9 injunction issued by the same FIVE-justice majority, three days before any deadline.[18\ However, two of those four dissenters (i.e. Justices Breyer and Souter) acknowledged that the counting up until December 9 had not conformed with Equal Protection requirements. In brief, the breakdown of the decisions was: Seven justices (the five Justice majority plus Breyer and Souter) agreed that there was an Equal Protection Clause violation in using different standards of counting in different counties. FIVE justices agreed that December 12 (the date of the decision) was the deadline Florida had established for recounts (Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist,[25\ Scalia and Thomas in support; Breyer,[26\ Ginsburg, Souter[27\ and Stevens opposed). Justices Breyer and Souter wanted to remand the case back to the Florida Supreme Court to permit that court to establish uniform standards of what constituted a legal vote and then manually recount all ballots using those standards. The view that the Florida Supreme Court acted contrary to the intent of the Florida legislature was accepted by only THREE of the nine justices (Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas). Justices Kennedy and O'Connor did not opine one way or the other on this issue. The Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's decision, calling for a statewide recount, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment". Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were seemingly applied to the recount from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. According to the 7-2 majority opinion, the statewide standard (that a "legal vote" is "one in which there is a 'clear indication of the intent of the voter'") could not guarantee that each county would count the votes in a constitutionally permissible fashion. The per curiam opinion stated that its applicability was "limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities."

Comment by chuckling on Tuesday, Jun 3 at 10:44 AM

hahaha - anybody who thinks a consortium of newspapers lead by the NY Times is to be instantly believed on any topic simply has not being paying attention. Trust but verify...immediately.

Comment by Carol on Tuesday, Jun 3 at 01:38 AM

And, one more thing, Sam: If the Supremes were so interested in meddling in Florida's election on the basis of the 14th Amendment, then why didn't they just remand back to the Florida Supreme Court asking them to come up with clear standards by which to count every vote, and also state that the legislature extend the deadline in order to do so if they were so damned concerned about "counting every vote"?

Comment by Sam on Monday, Jun 2 at 07:01 PM

Carol, I appreciate your deep passion in this matter and your visceral hatred of George W. Bush but when you accuse me of using selective quotes when I quote two newspapers that were part of the consortium of major newspapers that funded the recount, then you are just not thinking clearly. Your views of Bush since 2000 have nothing to do with this election conflict. If the New York Times and USA Today published articles are not good enough for you on the recounts, then I am speechless. You say that the Florida laws state that the Florida Supreme Court has the power to PROVIDE "ANY RELIEF" APPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. You also imply it is none of the Federal Courtâ??s business. Letâ??s look at this. I do not know the makeup of the current Florida Supreme Court, but those words would mean that if, (for example) in 1960, a candidate filed a complaint of irregularities and the Supreme Court of Florida decided that their preferred remedy was to count black votes as 5/8. You are saying that according to your reading of the statute, the US Supreme Court should not intervene. Let say the same thing happens this November and the Florida Supreme Court says that the Obama votes should only count ½ because of the Democrats rulings on May 31. I know those are extremely silly examples and on purpose. Any relief? If you prefer not to accept the New York Times and USA Today published articles on recounts, then be my guest. If you prefer Bugliosiâ??s thinking, be my guest. What you think of Bush is entirely and totally irrelevant. The Federal Supreme Court voted 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court was in error in their remedy. The seven who voted with the majority included David Souter and Stephen Breyer, both exceptionally liberal. Ruth Ginsburg and John Stevens were the only two dissenters. If Bugliosi wants to charge Souter and Breyer with treason, then so be it. They were part of the seven of nine. You should then call these judges the "Felonious Seven." I hope that your hatred and anger in this matter abates with time. At this point I am flummoxed and speechless. I wouldnâ??t know what to add. All the best to you Carol.

Comment by I am correct on Monday, Jun 2 at 10:08 AM

at least you admit you are wrong, "wrong as it gets" -because it is clear that you have learned nothing from history and fully intend to ignore the injustice that was done on May 31st by Democrats to a Democrat simply because they could. You dont get to whine about the past if you ignore it happening right now - not in my book. I cant stand people who tsk tsk about history because it is safer to do so at a distance than actually get involved today.