General Anthony Zinni is here. During his 35-year career as a Marine, he has served in some of the military’s most important posts. He led Central Command, the force that oversees the Middle East and South Asia, until he retired in 2000. Months later, he returned as President Bush’s envoy to the Middle East. But as the Bush administration prepared to invade Iraq, he became known as one of the most senior retired commanders to oppose the war. Earlier this year, he was a top choice to serve as President Obama’s ambassador to Iraq before Christopher Hill was named to the post. He recently published his latest book. It is titled "Leading the Charge: Leadership Lessons From the Battlefield to the Board Room." We’ll talk about that and much more. I’m pleased to have General Zinni back at this table. Welcome. ANTHONY ZINNI: Thank you, Charlie, good to be here. CHARLIE ROSE: Let me go first to the Middle East and come back to Iraq and Afghanistan. ANTHONY ZINNI: Sure. CHARLIE ROSE: Is that the most important thing we can do in that region, is somehow bring the Israelis and the Palestinians together? ANTHONY ZINNI: Definitely. I know that many would argue that, well, Iran is more serious or Afghanistan, but psychologically in that part of the world-- and it’s been this way for decades-- that is the most significant issue. And more than anything else, it could lead to resolution to other issues and really create relationships in the region that would benefit stability and reconstruction in some areas. CHARLIE ROSE: How could it do that, if in fact, there was some kind of agreement in the creation of a Palestinian state? ANTHONY ZINNI: I think in many cases, you take away the cause of many of the extremists and what they base driving the civil discontent and the - - driving the streets to become upset because of the plight of the Palestinians. That would just sort of rip out the foundation for many of these extremist movements. I think also, a relationship then that would be followed up by diplomatic relations between Arabs and Israelis and others would create a different atmosphere out there, an atmosphere of cooperation not just in terms of security, but economic and other areas that would benefit the region. And I think that it’s been something that I’ve seen certainly from the Arab side and the Israeli side and many other places, that if you could put that behind you, you can move on in many constructive ways to do other things. And I think political cooperation, security cooperation, economic cooperation could all follow from that. CHARLIE ROSE: What’s necessary for the United States to do? ANTHONY ZINNI: Well, we are probably the only one that can broker any kind of deal. We obviously are the most trusted by the Israelis. We have influence in the Arab world. I think the Arab world, Muslim world, feel we have to be the brokers in this. I know that from my own experience out there. And we probably could bring international cooperation and support. I think that whatever resolution is made, you’re going to have to see some investment out there, some incentives and other kinds of motivational resources provided to -- on both sides, for them to make the compromises they need to make and settle some of the differences they have, and provide the incentives and the enticement to move toward resolution. We’ll play a big role in that, and we’ll play a big role in bringing others, the Europeans and maybe the more wealthy Arab states into some sort of cooperative way of providing those resources. CHARLIE ROSE: What should we do and what should be our opposition on settlements, and what should we do to more than encourage the Israelis not to enhance settlements? ANTHONY ZINNI: I mean, obviously you can’t resolve one of the major issues-- which is borders-- without resolving the settlements issues. And going back to Prime Minister Barak and Prime Minister Olmert, they had put solutions on the table that basically had the 1967 borders with some adjustments with some of the major settlements, some land tradeoffs and that sort of thing. But that’s all going to require reshaping settlements, and maybe removing some, maybe allowing some to exist and expand a little bit within their own boundaries, and compensation land and that sort of thing. But I think the continual expansion of settlements has always become an impediment to moving forward, because on the Palestinian side and in the Arab world, while you’re negotiating, you’re seeing the land being sort of eaten away and occupied and settled then, and the argument that these settlements were only internal growth isn’t proven on the ground. You see these extensions, these little trailers up on the next ridgeline, and obviously that has to in good faith and to move forward, that’s going to have to stop. CHARLIE ROSE: Everybody assume this, that the shape of the final agreement is already there. ANTHONY ZINNI: I believe that. I mean, I think that we’ve had the greatest minds in the world probably for almost five decades working on this and. CHARLIE ROSE: What about Jerusalem? ANTHONY ZINNI: Jerusalem, I think will have to be some sort of accommodation between East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem. Some sort of maybe international open city for the religious parts, and so the people could observe their religious ceremonies and things that they do in the sites there, including Christians now, not just Jews and Muslims, but there’s obviously a large Christian community there that has what they consider pieces of Jerusalem that they revere and are important to them. And it will have to be worked in a way where I think, you know, that there’s assurances that it will move forward, it will be -- there will be security. I’m a big believer you’ve got to work all these issues at the same time. You can’t do them sequentially. You’re going to have to work security, the economic issues, the border issues, the land issues, the political issues. And I think what we’ve done -- the mistake we’ve made in the past is we sort of settled for summits and agreements in principle. They don’t go anywhere. I mean, one of my missions was Secretary Powell told me, "I don’t need another Zinni plan." He says "put one of these plans into play." And I had to take the Tenet plan and build a work plan, an actual how we’re going to do it. And that becomes much tougher than these sort of agreements in principle that we can paper the walls with. CHARLIE ROSE: So, what’s always the hangup? ANTHONY ZINNI: The hangup, you know, I… CHARLIE ROSE: Trust? ANTHONY ZINNI: I think it’s political risk. If you look at those that took risks for peace -- Sadat, Rabin, King Hussein, they suffered for it. CHARLIE ROSE: They all were killed. ANTHONY ZINNI: Well, they were killed, or King Hussein was almost killed. And their own people sort of turned on them. CHARLIE ROSE: That’s right, there were a lot of attempts, but he died of natural causes. ANTHONY ZINNI: There were a lot of attempts, yes. And so it’s been very difficult to see that if you take that risk, your legacy is going to be rewarded for it, that people are going to appreciate on either side. In my time there, I saw with both Sharon and Arafat that every time they would attempt to do something or take a risk, if something -- you know, if Sharon removed a checkpoint and then there was a terrorist attack, you know, you pay an internal political price for this. So it’s going to take a lot of courage by leaders on both sides to make compromises, to make agreements, and then hold fast to them. CHARLIE ROSE: How do you factor in Hamas? ANTHONY ZINNI: Well, I mean, I think Hamas clearly -- the Palestinians have to figure out how to bring Hamas into the fold. I’m in complete agreement with the conditions. They always have to recognize the Israelis. You can’t sit at the table and not recognize the person across from you, you know, who has the capacity to resolve what you’re negotiating. I think they have to disavow use of violence and commit to a sort of a Sinn Fein process. CHARLIE ROSE: Should they do that before they talk? I mean, that’s one of those big issues where you say, "That’s what we ought to talk about." Or do you say, "Unless you agree to all these things, we’re not going to talk to you?" It’s the Iranian issue, too. ANTHONY ZINNI: Well, you know, diplomatically, you can get into pre- negotiations to settle the conditions for negotiations. There’s all sorts of ways to get to that. CHARLIE ROSE: Back channels and all (INAUDIBLE). ANTHONY ZINNI: Back channels. Yes, as a matter of fact, that’s a good point. I really believe there ought to be three channels in these. There ought to be a back channel, a private channel, a public channel, and what would be called a track two or unofficial channel, where ideas could be floated, but there’s no political risk because they can be done by retired diplomats, military people, academics. But you can plant ideas and float them, and there’s no sort of political commitment or political risk. What would the reaction be if we did this, if we made this compromise on settlements or refugees? CHARLIE ROSE: How about the stuff that’s on the ground, the checkpoints and the Israeli fear always of some kind of suicide attack? How do you deal with that sort of on the ground? ANTHONY ZINNI: I mean, to their credit, they’ve taken risks before. When I was there, they removed some checkpoints. They paid a price for it. But even now, they’ve turned over some of the cities like Jenin and Nablus to Palestinian security. They’ve removed some checkpoints, more than some, a considerable number. So they are taking a risk and testing the waters. And my latest, talking to people I know out there on the Israeli side, they think there is some positive movement on the West Bank to maintain security and build the appropriate security forces and the right guarantees. That it’s going slowly, but so far, you know, knock on wood, the progress has been there. CHARLIE ROSE: What’s your assessment of Netanyahu? ANTHONY ZINNI: Well, I think it’s going to be difficult for him. I mean, obviously he’s formed this. CHARLIE ROSE: The foreign minister is very right. ANTHONY ZINNI: Yes, very right. And obviously the coalition has had to have parties that are far to the right in order to get the majority necessary. So it’s going to be very difficult because of the political makeup of that coalition government on some of these issues. It’s going to be very hard and more difficult. It make take a different kind of government. But I think if there’s movement -- I mean, the other thing we haven’t mentioned here is Syria. And there are those that feel that that issue may be riper than the issue with the Palestinians and it could be resolved sooner. And that might provide a catalyst for a more positive direction. CHARLIE ROSE: What is your reading of Assad? What does he want? What does he need? What are his interests? ANTHONY ZINNI: Well, I mean, obviously it’s the Golan Heights/Shebaa Farms issue, and then also I think economic incentives. CHARLIE ROSE: But the Israelis have been always prepared to negotiate over that, haven’t they? ANTHONY ZINNI: Yes. I think they’re ready. With the right conditions -- I think they’re going to have to break their links with the Iranians, the Syrians, and there are going to be certain security assurances that have to be provided, and the quid for that would be not only the territory, the occupied territory, but also maybe some economic incentives that could be put on the table by us or Europeans or combinations, or even some of the Arab nations. CHARLIE ROSE: What Arab government can make the most difference? ANTHONY ZINNI: Well, I mean, obviously the Egyptians. CHARLIE ROSE: They have more men under arms? ANTHONY ZINNI: They’re larger. They’re obviously a significant force in the Arab world. Saudis very much key, King Abdullah, who had an initiative, you know, and it came from a surprising quarter, you would think the most conservative, but it’s put it out there. CHARLIE ROSE: Basically said something if you go back to ’66, ’67, we’ll recognize the Israeli government -- every Arab country will recognize the Israeli government. ANTHONY ZINNI: And I think it’s more than that. That’s sort of the shorthand version. I’ve even heard them talk about ’67 with adjustments, and so there’s been a little bit of easing in exactly the terms. And I think, you know, in my experience out there, they desperately want this resolved. CHARLIE ROSE: "They" meaning everybody? ANTHONY ZINNI: By the Arab world, the Muslim world. And I think Syria is the other one. So if you look at Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, those are the keys. And of course, many of the smaller Arab nations, too, that are very active. CHARLIE ROSE: Is the president on the right track, do you think? First with Mitchell, second the Cairo speech? ANTHONY ZINNI: Yes. I do believe the Cairo speech was very useful. But it has to be followed up by action. I think. CHARLIE ROSE: And the action ought to be simply saying we’re on the case, I mean, they’ve got Mitchell there going from one capital to another. ANTHONY ZINNI: Yes. More than just envoys. I mean, having been an envoy, I can tell you, it’s got to be more substantial to that. But Senator Mitchell is establishing offices in Jerusalem. He’s got people on the ground. There’s permanent presence that is increasing in size. I think that’s important. You have to work economic, political, security issues, work them in detail, do it simultaneously, you know, light a thousand fires out there. CHARLIE ROSE: But isn’t this one place that really does need an envoy? Even though you could argue envoys occasionally cause some misunderstanding of accountability and the flow of power? ANTHONY ZINNI: I would use a different term, and I don’t think it’s an envoy. I think it’s a permanent representative, almost like an ambassador in position to work this issue. CHARLIE ROSE: Ambassador to the region? ANTHONY ZINNI: Ambassador to the region or ambassador to the issue, but there. I mean, I’d set up business. CHARLIE ROSE: So, if you don’t use the term envoy, the important point is to have somebody living there? ANTHONY ZINNI: Yes. And full-time. An envoy sort of has a connotation of temporary nature, back and forth. And I know from personal experience, the envoy comes home, people read too much into it. And the envoy becomes the issue or the center of attention, and you want the mediation. The other thing I would say, I’m not a big fan of the mediator putting the plan on the table. I mean, I’ve done eight-piece (ph) mediation, and the parties have to come up with it. They’ve sort of copped out and said, you know, the U.S. will put the next plan, the road map, the path to peace or whatever. And we sort of get conned into doing this. And I’ve heard both sides, Arab, Israelis and others, say, well, you have to, only you can do it, put it on the table. I’m really convinced that for it to be a comprehensive, sustainable plan, they have to put -- they have to work it out and put it on the table. We should not be in the business of putting plans on the table. We should instead be in the business of helping them come to that solution. CHARLIE ROSE: One small note of history. What caused the failure of Camp David? ANTHONY ZINNI: Well, I think, you know, my own personal opinion, I don’t think Arafat was ready to make that deal, if he ever was. In my talking to Arafat when I was out there one on one, my sense was that he had a legacy, the legacy of a revolutionary that never gave in. And I think in his mind, he saw that as somebody else’s who followed on to make the compromise and the deal. He was very aware of what happened to Sadat and Rabin and even Hussein, and actually said that to me. And I think. CHARLIE ROSE: He said, look, if I do this, somebody will get me. ANTHONY ZINNI: His exact words to me, "You won’t follow my funeral like you did with them," meaning that he’s assassinated for having made the compromises. I think he saw his role -- I don’t want to read too much into this, but I think he saw his role as I was the revolutionary, I made the case, I got us in a position where we can create a resolution, but it’s going to be for the next guy to work the details and maybe make the compromises. He said to me one time, he looked at me and he said "I am a general like you, I am the only undefeated Arab general." That told me a lot, that expression. CHARLIE ROSE: That he had enormous pride and that he did not want to be... ANTHONY ZINNI: He did not want to be seen as… CHARLIE ROSE: Acquiescing? ANTHONY ZINNI: … as giving and acquiescing and compromising, and then losing what he had gained as a revolutionary. CHARLIE ROSE: From everything you know, and knowing that you’ve been out of power for a while, will the Israelis strike against Iran if there is no success in getting Russia to lean on Iran and all the possibilities seem to be evaporating? ANTHONY ZINNI: I think clearly the Israelis see Iran as an existential threat. I think clearly they think that there is a red line, that when you hit that red line, whether it’s enough fissable material or whatever it is, it’s probably something shorter even of weaponization, that there has to be action taken if nothing else is happening. I do not believe the Israelis would strike without -- I wouldn’t say our concurrence, necessarily, but our acknowledgment that they’re going to do it. It would expose our troops in the region, expose our interests in the region if they were to do it unilaterally, in a pre-emptory fashion that didn’t advise us. And, of course, if they advise us, we would have to take precautions that would be very evident. We’d have to, you know, air- to-missile defense, protect ships and everything else. And I think the problem with the strike is thinking through the consequences of Iranian reaction. One mine that hits a tanker, and you can imagine what is going to happen to the price of oil and economies around the world. One missile into a Gulf oil field or a natural gas processing field, you can imagine what’s going to happen. A missile attack on some of our troop formations in the Gulf or our bases in Iraq, activating sleeper cells, flushing out fast patrol boats and dowels that have mines that can go into the water in the Red Sea and elsewhere. You can see all these reactions that are problematic in so many ways. Economic impact, national security impact -- it will drag us into a conflict. I think anybody that believes that it would be a clean strike and it would be over and there would be no reaction is foolish. CHARLIE ROSE: So, what do you think the Israelis believe? ANTHONY ZINNI: I think they’re agonizing over it. I think they really believe there has to be a red line and there has to be action taken if that red line is crossed. And I think they realize that a reaction will cause all these kinds of other problems. So I think much like us, they’re thinking about what do we do when we hit that red line? How do we -- we can’t make assumptions about reaction. We have to protect our forces, our economic interests and other things in the region that are vital to our well-being and survival, and those things could be very expensive, and launch us into a third conflict, if you will, of major proportions. It will make Iraq and Afghanistan look relatively small in comparison, in terms of troop requirements and everything else. CHARLIE ROSE: Then can we stop them from doing it if they believe the red line is passed, crossed? ANTHONY ZINNI: I think that we have opportunities now internally in Iran. Now I think we should be more encouraging of the reformers and the youth. CHARLIE ROSE: Do you believe that a coalition of forces on sanctions can be imposed that will hurt the Iranian leadership, this leadership so much so that it will change its attitude about a nuclear weapon and even its behavior towards its own.? ANTHONY ZINNI: I don’t think it’s sanctions alone. I think it’s part of a mix of things. I think it’s constantly drawing attention to what they’re doing internally to their people, of human rights being denied, of this great Persian society not fulfilling its place rightfully in the community of nations in a responsible way. These are the themes I think that could really impact internally into Iran and have an effect. CHARLIE ROSE: I’m trying to understand, because I (INAUDIBLE) this part. Is it -- which of those have we done and how do you do them? I mean, the people who were in the streets know the United States supports them, prefers them, wants to see them successful. And I think they probably also understand the United States has to deal with the government in some point. ANTHONY ZINNI: Yes. Well. CHARLIE ROSE: Otherwise, who’s going to stop... ANTHONY ZINNI: I think they would like to see us much more vocal about this and much more active and energizing the international community and speaking about these things. Now, look. CHARLIE ROSE: So, we should internationally lead the case for the reformers. ANTHONY ZINNI: Absolutely. Absolutely. And I think you’re seeing, too, a split in the regime. I mean, Rafsanjani and Khatami… CHARLIE ROSE: Well, it’s clear. ANTHONY ZINNI: So, you’re even beginning to see a split in the regime. And I think it’s time to push this issue. You know, they are experts, the hard-liners in there, about releasing some pressure -- you know, a little bit of academic freedom, freedom of the press, maybe letting some reform candidates run, and sort of taking the pressure off, and then coming back later and slowly pulling these things back away. And you’re going to see them try to repeat this process, in my mind, to try to ease this down. And.... CHARLIE ROSE: You’ll see them try to crack down more or are you going to see what? ANTHONY ZINNI: Oh, I think you’re going to see them seemingly give into some things. They’ll -- you know, this is classically what they’ve done. And it sort of releases the pressure, eases it down. The reformers begin to believe they’re making some progress, and then later on they come back and pull much of this back in. CHARLIE ROSE: So therefore... ANTHONY ZINNI: So therefore, I think it’s time now to keep the pressure on. I would certainly not be an advocate of inciting revolution, and I don’t think the reformers want another violent revolution. CHARLIE ROSE: So, what they want is for the United States to lead an international... ANTHONY ZINNI: Yes. They want the world to be -- to be outraged and to look at what’s going on in there, to be sympathetic and supportive of what they’re doing, and to keep that kind of pressure on this regime. CHARLIE ROSE: So you don’t think the president did enough? ANTHONY ZINNI: I would have liked to have seen more. I think we sort of got ourselves trapped in making the gesture to Iran that we wanted to open up a dialogue. I would not have had the president lead on this. I think, you know, the opening may have come at a lower level. He kind of led on this in a personal way, and Ahmadinejad sort of rejected this, and I think it was a bit embarrassing, and we had made that gesture and sort of got trapped into a situation where we’re a little bit reluctant to push on this now since we might have to deal with Ahmadinejad. And I think that got us in this position. I would have much rather seen us made the gesture at a lower level, and to feel it out, to see if anything was there. CHARLIE ROSE: Where do you think the Chinese and the Russians would be if we took this tack? ANTHONY ZINNI: Well, again, I think if the Chinese and the Russians felt that there was potential for a popular movement inside Iran, they wouldn’t want to lose their relationship with an Iran that might be changing and be seen -- if this regime were to collapse -- as supportive of a regime that was repressive and then rejected by the people. So I think if this thing gets legs, you might see them less willing to support the hard-line regime. CHARLIE ROSE: If we missed the opportunity at the beginning, it’s not too late and now might be the appropriate time, as you said, rather than letting up on the pressure, increase the pressure? ANTHONY ZINNI: I believe that, yeah. I think that’s what we should do. And I think it’s the right thing to do. I mean, we’re advocates of human rights and good governance and the kinds of -- and this is an important society out there. It’s not just sort of some sort of rogue state. You have a fairly well-educated society that’s always been prominent the in the region. CHARLIE ROSE: Young. ANTHONY ZINNI: Young. Tuned into the world. CHARLIE ROSE: And they say pro-American in whatever sense that is. ANTHONY ZINNI: Yes. CHARLIE ROSE: They obviously want to be independent, and if they have nuclear technology and all those kinds of things, that’s a nationalism issue, not a. ANTHONY ZINNI: Exactly. CHARLIE ROSE: Not a geopolitical issue for them. ANTHONY ZINNI: Exactly. We should never underestimate Persian pride. And that’s a strong factor, even amongst those that want to see this regime removed and see a more responsive, credible secular regime in place. CHARLIE ROSE: So the president ought to be out front or the secretary of state or the national security adviser and... ANTHONY ZINNI: All of the above. CHARLIE ROSE: And then they ought to be ringing up their colleagues in foreign capitals and saying, "This is outrageous, and we all benefit from a free Iran." ANTHONY ZINNI: Absolutely. How can we look at someone that obviously stole this election in a very openly egregious way, and then say we’re going to deal with this regime? I mean, I think you’re going to lose credibility on the streets of Tehran and elsewhere in Iran. CHARLIE ROSE: Do you believe that we cannot, as the president has said and others have said, it is -- we cannot allow Iran to have a nuclear capability? ANTHONY ZINNI: I believe that we -- that that would be a problem, for them to have the bomb. And it would require -- if they were to get the bomb and we could -- we did not strike, we would have to alter our whole system of containment and action in the Middle East, which would be counterproductive. I think -- you know, I agree with Senator McCain and all those that have said that that is a red line. Now, what you do about it becomes problematic. There are no good answers. I mean, if you decide on a strike, all the things we talked about here could be the outcome in how you handle that. So the idea is not to get to that point. You have got to start trying to prevent that now. And diplomacy and pressure and sanctions and encouragement of those in the streets that went out there very courageously are the kinds of things that can be done now. CHARLIE ROSE: Smart power. ANTHONY ZINNI: Smart power. CHARLIE ROSE: That was part one of our conversation with General Zinni. Part two tomorrow night. See you then. END 10